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The contrast between implicit and explicit knowledge is 
perhaps nowhere greater than in man's use of language. If a 
person wishes to record and systematize what it is that he 
"knows" in knowing his language, he cannot simply write it 
down--he has to.discover it first. And in attempting. to dis-
cover the nature of his linguistic knowledge, he will find that 
satisfactory statements do not come easily. It is quite certain 
that the average adult speaker of English simply co~ld not, 
even if given a year's time, come up with anything like a reliable 
explanation of how the word EVER is used and what it means. And 
yet this same person has probably never in his adult life "made 
a mistake" in his use of this word, or used it in ways that were 
inappropriate to his intentions. 
What a speaker of a language knows about the individual 
words of his language and the conditions that determine their 
appropriate use is perhaps the most accessible aspect of linguis-
tic knowledge, but it too is at times extremely subtle and--at 
least on the face of it--extremely ,complex. In th~s paper I hope 
to explore some of this subtlety and complexity by considering 
how speakers of English use and understand two very ordinary verbs, 
HIT and BREAK~ 
My treatment of these words, and the kinds of evidence I 
shall appeal to in uncovering their grammatical and semantic 
properties, will bear some similarity to the style of argument 
one finds in the writings ·of the so-called "ordinary language" 
philosophers, but with two important differences. The first of 
these is that, unlike words like KNOW, GOOD, OUGHT, REAL, or 
EXIST, the words HIT and BREAK, in themselves, have no philoso-
phical interest. The second is that a linguist's analysis of 
words cannot be accounted satisfactory until his observations can 
be incorporated into a general empirical theory of linguistic 
structure. We cannot be satisfied that our inquiry has been 
completed, in other words, until we are convinced that the con-
cepts and principles we have used in organizing our observations 
are proper to some substantively and formally specific explanatory 
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,cheory of t.he.nat.ure of human language •. Wha,t this means in. 
:practice is that the linguist keeps the connection w;lth empiri-
cal linguistic theo:ry in mind, at least, whereas the pliilosopher 
traditionally has not bee~ e~pected to do s9. 
A grammatical description of a language is successful if 
it accounts for precisely ~he facility that an ideal speaker al 
a language has in producing and understanding the grammetical 
sentences in his language. The knowledge that the speaker brings 
to bear in exercising this ability may be separated into the 
F,eneral and the snecific. One's general knowledge about a lang-
uage is organized and displayed in its grammar~ one's specific 
knowledge about the individual linguistic objects known as words 
or 11 lexemes 11 is collected and itemized in a dictionary or lexicon 
of the language. In this paper I shall attempt to determine at 
least some of the specific things that speakers of English know 
which account for their ability to use the words HIT and BREAK 
correctly. Put differently. the goal of this paper is to discover 
the information that needs to be registered, in one way or another, 
in the entries for the8e two words in a scientifically sound 
dictionary. It is in this sense an exercise in lexicological 
research. 
The reader mi&ht at first be inclined to think that the task  
we have set for ourselves has already been completed--that an1-
one who wants to learn the lexical facts about HIT and BREAK  
can do so 1~ite readily by looking the words up in a standard  
diction-ry. It can be shown very easily, however, that there  
are indeed important fact~ about words which the rr.akers of dic- 
tionaries do noL generally bother to tell us. For examplet if 
you look up the worcls SICK and ILL in a standard dictionary, you 
will be told that they are synony~ous in one of their meanings, 
but what. yo1., will not be told i.s that a1though both of these adjec-
tives can ccc~r as predicates, only SICK can occur aLtrib11tively, 
Notir:e examples {l) and (2). 
[sj,c\t}U} the c:-,ildrcn arc ill 
( "-) ) I 
r sick 7t *ill J 
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· 0,1:'. if.:·yo;u' i.ool', up__tho wo~d· GOOD, ycu .will not fir1d o.ut fro)n t.he 
dictionary something that every speaker c.f English knows, '.'Ind 
~hat every foreign speaker of English needs to know, tnat ~,OOD 
is {apparently) the only adjective in Englie~ which ca~ take, 
in negat.ive and ir. te.rroe;ativc predicate sentences, the "quantifier" 
ANY. Notice examples (3) and (4). 
, . r gcoc:. , 1{ 3) .i.s 1 t any J,, ~ • · . L pim~ .J 
( 4) rgood 
1 
'-hey weren't. any -'i,. • 1 fC. ta.:. .J 
An ordtnary dictionary will not Lell us everything lhat there 
is to know about iil'l' and BREAK; there is much we shall have to 
figure out for our-selvc::i. One of the things that it \'/ill tell  
us. however, is that each of these words has aeveral senses.  
We shall concern ourselves here only with what might be called  
their basic or non-transferred meanings. We sha.11 consider their 
use in expressions about HI'f'f!NG TREES and BREAKING STICKS, but 
we shall ignore t.heir use in expreesions about HITTING U.PON GOOD 
IDEAS or BREAKING IN A NEW MA...'l, for exan1ple. 
The first problem to take note of is that in a grammar  
which requires subjects in the deep str~cture1 representation of  
1 
For a statement of the distinction between "deep" and "surface"  
repreaentations of the structure of sentences, the reader is  
referred to Chomsky (1966), pp. 31-51, and Chomsky (1965).  
every sentence, it is necessa-ry to. recogn~ze three distinct  
verbs having the foro BREAK and t ·  wo aistinct verbs having the  
form HIT, and that these distinctions ar~  
, "'" unaffecte.d by the 
. d~cision to restri'ct ou1· attention to the b · 
these words.2 asic meanings of 
2. 
Alt~ough it is certainly nos ··1 t 
examination in such a - 5J.o e o rephrase th f 
several distinct us~~ wal.Yt ~ha~ :here is _one v~.~b EeR~acta under 
""" 1.s . 1-. "' .c!..4.K wi tn·complexity that _, i.rnJJor ,ant to real. , 
reformulation concerns us here is in no l~e tfiat the formal 
• , way a1fect.ed by t·. 
!llS 
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The three BREAK verbs may be re fer red to as BREAK..:f, BREAK-:-2 
and BREAK-3. BREAK-1, which i6 illustrated in sent.cnce (5) 
(5) the stic~ broke 
is ao intransitive verb which asserts of its subject the parti-
cular deformation or change of state we associate with the 
meaning of the verb. 
BREAK-2 is seen in sentence (6) 
(6) John broke the stick (with a rock) 
It ia used for asserting of an object the same change-of-state 
ment1oned in connection with BREAK-i, but BREAK-2 asserts it of 
its direct object. In general, precisely those noun phrases 
which can occur as subjects of BHEAK-1 can appear as objects of 
BREAK-2. BREAK-2 assigns an agentive or instigative role to its 
.subject. which is typically animate. As shown :i.n the parenthe-
sized expansion of (6). BREAK-2 may co-occur with a phrase which 
identifies the instrument, i.e •• the inanimate object immediately 
responsible for the action of breaking. 
8REAK-3, seen in s-ntence (7) 
(7) a rock broke tte stick 
differs from BREAK-2 in accepting inanimate subjects3 and in not 
3There are good reasons for saying that an instrumental noun 
phrase (in the intended sense) is always underlyingly inanimate. 
A sentence like THE DOG BROKE THE STICK, when it is used to 
refer to what happened to the stick when we threw the dog at it, 
m~st then be interpreted as containing in it6 deep structure the 
noun ph:-ase 'fF.E DOG 1 S BODY. The word BODY, then, being inanimate, 
is capable cf fulfilling an instrumental function in the clause. 
There are languages in which the distinction between THE DOG as 
agent and experiencer and THE DOG (::; THE DOG'S BODY) as physical 
object must be made overt. Mohawk, Paul Postal has informed me, 
is one such langua~e. 
permitting an instrument phrase in the same clause. In oLher 
words, a sentence like (8) 
(8) •a rock broke the stick with a hammer 
is ungcccptable (where A ROCK is not intended metaphorically), 
because this verb interprets the role of it6 subject instrumentally, 
and a simplex clause presumably can only identify one 
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trtniHr~4m!;'i,if'1:~.:· BREAK..:.2.artd ·.:sR_EAK-3 a'gr·e&,._, ·l··n t'h 0"" _s·eman t i·c 
4A simplex ~_lauae identifie5 at rno6t one noun phrase as having 
an instrtimen.tal role. TM,s is not to den~· that the noun phrase 
can b-e compqund. 
reJation to the direct object. 
There a:ie t.hree BREAK verbs. bttt there are only two verbs 
wit.h the fo.rm HIT (in t.be meaning we ·have in mind); and these 
are H!T-1, s9en in (0) 
(9) John hit the tree (with a rocld, 
and HIT-2, seen in sentence (10) 
(10) a rock hit the tree. 
HIT-2 pa.rall:els .BREAK-3 in ae;isigning an instrumental role to ita 
(inanimate)· subject, and in not tolerating an instrumental WITH-
phrase, That is, sentence (11) 
<1i) •a r!lck hit the tree with a sticJ.:: 
is unacceptable. And HIT-1 parallels BREAK-2 in assigning an 
agentive role to its (animate) subject and in accepting an instru-
mental phrase ( as in' the parenthesize_d expansion of (9)}. The 
two verbs BI'r ae;ree in ~heir semantic relation to the direct. 
object. 
Our two sets of verbs differ in that there 1$ no intransi-
tive verb.HIT corresponding with BREA.K-1, since there is no 
sentence of the form (12}. 
(12) *the tree hit 
This division of aREAK into three verbs and HIT into tvto 
verbs is ne ce5Sary if we 11tish to include in our descriptions of 
what we know about individual verbs constraint.a on the noun-
phrases that can occur in construction with them. the sentenc~ 
types in which they can play a role, and the semantic relatio~s 
which they express among the constituents of the clauses in 
whieh they are used. 5 But ciearly there is something wrong with 
c.:. 
..,The nature of these differences b'etv,een Ot..lr two verbs and t.he 
necess~ry complexity of their description in f;rammars which 
require underlyin* subjects for all a~ntences are discussed in 
detail in Hall (1965), 
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a grammatical model, or with an interpretation of a grammatical 
6model, which requires there to be two HITs and three BREAKs. 
6In this essay I have only consid~red interpretations of (5)-
(10) that regard them as simplex sentences. A competing view, 
very convincingly presented in Lakoff (1967), would have them 
all be complex (involving su~cessive emb~ddings) and wouid 
MSign to them deep structures of an extremely abstract character. 
I know at the moment no empirical data that would be relevant 
to a choice between these two views, and it seems to me that 
neither the facts about HIT and BREAK nor the concluding message 
about the role of a sem~ntic theory would be affected by a choice 
between them. 
We shall reject this formulation, then, and propose a different 
description of the facts we have encountered. We shall assume 
that in some way certain noun phrases can be designated in the 
deep structure as having an agentive relation to the verbs they 
are in construction with, others designated as having an tnstru-
mental role. , Let us label these noun phrases Agent and Instru-
ment, and let us assume that a part of our specific knowledge. . 
about each verb ·in our language is a knowledge of the "kinds" 
of noun phrasea (in the sense.we are suggesting) that can occur 
in construction with it. We are forced to abandon the notions 
of deep structure subject and deep structure object, if.we take 
this approach, and we must therefore accept a model of grammar 
in which the subjects and objects that we see in surface struc-
tures are introduced by rules. 
Temporarily giving the noun phrase THE STICK in examples 
(5) to (8) the label "X", we may describe BREAK as a verb which 
requires an X and which permits either an Agent or an Instrument 
or both. Syntactic rules will specify that if there is only an 
X, the X noun phrase must be the subject. If there is an Agent, 
then the X appears as the direct object and the Agent as subject. 7 
7We ignore here the rules that result in "passive" sentences. 
A more detailed description of the operation of syntactic rules 
in a grammar of the type suggested here may be seen in Fillmore 
(1968). 
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If an Instr'.lment is selected with BREAK, it becomes the su-bject 
just in case there is no Agent, but it shows up at the end of the 
clause, with the preposition WITH, just in case the sentence does 
contain an Agent. The selectional possibilities for BREAK can 
be summarized by saying tha~ it can occur in construction with 
any of the combinations of noun phrases representable by formula 
(13). 
(13) (Agent)(Instrument~ X 
The parenthesis notation means that the formula holds whether a 
parenthesized element is present or not. The left-to-right order 
of the elements is irrelevant. 
By assigning the change-of-state asserted by BREAK to the 
entity identified by the X noun phrase, by allowing the agentive 
or instrumental roles of noun phrases to be specified directly 
by the categories Agent and Instrument, by providing for the 
selection of subjects and objects in the ways mentioned above, 
and by adopting some formalism which guarantees that ~oun phrases 
occurring as Agents are animate while noun phrases occurring as 
' ! 
Instruments are inanimate, we can account for all of the syntactic 
and semantic observations that were presented in connection with 
examples (5) to (8). It is important to realize that this inter-
pretation does not require the separation of BREAK into three 
distinct verbs. 
By us~ng the same concepts and rules as those we have just 
proposed, we can similarly simplify our description of HIT. We 
need to say of HIT, however, that it cannot occur alone with 
its X element, because sentence (1~) is to be excluded. The 
phenomena we have observed about HIT can be represented as 
.formula (14) 
(14) (Agent Unstrument) X 
in which the linked parenthesis notation means that at least one 
of the two elements so linked must be present. 
Of course, this 11 simplification" would be no simplification 
at all if the categories and rules, and the grammatical distinc-
tions we must recognize to make the rules work, were applicable 
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only to the verbs HIT and BREAK. I have developed elsewhere 
Fillmore (1968) 
the outlines of a general grammatical theory which incorporates 
modifications of the type we have been discussing. These matters 
need not concern us here, but it should at least be pointed out 
that the observations we have made about BREAK and HIT are true 
of many other English verbs as well. Verbs which are semantically 
similar to BREAK and whose occurrence in clause types is accounted 
for by formula (13) are exemplified in (15); some English verbs 
sharing with HIT properties identified by formula (14) are given 
in (16). 
(15) bend, fold, shatter, crack 
(16) slap, strike, bump, stroke 
Since (13) an.d (14) identify classes of verbs, it may be 
the case that ceftain propertie~ of HIT and BREAK are associated 
in general with the verb classes to which they belong,.other 
properties being more uniquely associated with the two words as 
individual lexical items. 
In determining what these shared properties might be, we 
may first_ note t~at all of the verbs we chose to associate with 
BREAK. assert that the object identified by the X elements under-
stood as undergoing some kind of change of state. That is, the 
X element is understood as essentially different after the event 
symbolized by the verb has "happened" to it. But this does not 
seem to hold for the verbs classified by formula (14). For the 
purposes of this essay, we shall refer to verbs like BREAK and 
BEND as change £1. state verbs, and verbs like HIT and SLAP as 
surface contact verbs. The surface contact verbs assert the 
occurrence of some physical contact between two objects, but 
from the use of these verbs one cannot necessarily infer that 
the objects have undergone any essential change. 9 The most 
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·f course, the surface contact verbs can also be said to 
identify a 11 change-of.;.sta.te" of some kind.. In .a purely abstract 
sense, a chee~ whicti has on~e been slapped ia ditrerel¾t from the 
same cheek before the slapping event took place. The ;semantic 
structures of~ words recognize pro?erties of objects dis-
coverable not in the objects themselves but in their 11,,histories" 
(words like BASTARD or WIDOW), but such matters have no rele-
vance to the distinction betwe~n the two kinds of verri:'s we are 
discussing here. ' 
direct wa.y of seeing thi6 fact is by comparing our acceptance of 
sentence pairs like {l?') and (18), in which verbs of these two 
kinds are contrast.ed. 
(17) 	 I lli the window with a hammer; it didn't t~ze 
the windov1 9 hut the hammer shattered 
(18} "'I broke the window with a hammer; it; didn't faze 
the window. but the hammer shatt~red. 
There is, then, a semantic as well as a syntactic difference 
between our two classes of verbs. We can capture some of these 
facts by replacing our temporary symbol.X by Place in formula 
(14)·, which we associated \'lith the surface contact verbs. For the 
other X we may use (tor want ot a better word) the term Obje,ct. 
We can now reformulate (13) and (14) as (19) and (20) respectively, 
and associate part of the meaning of expressions containing our 
verbs with these newly introduced categories of noun phrases~ 
(19) (Agent ){Instrument) Object 
(2Q) {Agenttlnstrum-,nt} Place 
The lexical entries for BREAK and HIT are assumed to contain 
references to formula.a (19) and (20) respectively. 
' 
Change-of:-state verbs, as we have said, are verbs which 
assert of an object a change in time from one "state" to another. 
An additional syntactic difference between the two verb classes 
is that 	stative adjectives c.µ,. be derived from th!!= change r:Jt 
state verbs, but not from the 	others. These adjectives describe 
the later of the two states refer.rod to by their underlying. 	 I 
verbs. A consequenee of this 	fact is that sentences like those  
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in (21) are ambiguous in ways in .,.,h.ich sentences like (22) are 
not. 
(21) 	 the window was {~:~~en { 
shatter.edj 
£hit }(22) the window was 	 struck 5lapped 
! 
I 
The sentences of (21) may be understood either as passives or 
as descriptions of states while those of (22) can only be under-
stood as passives. 
One more syntactic difference between change of state verbs 
and surface-contact verbs can be seen when the Object or Place 
noun phrase is a possessed body-part noun. The sentences with 
surface-contact verbs have paraphrases in which the rrpossessor'1 
appears as the direct object and the body part noun appears in 
a locative prepositional phrase. 10 Notice (23) to (26). 
lOThis fact, incidentally, tends to lend support to our choice 
of the category Place for the 11direct objectstt or surface con-
tact verbs. Some surface-contact verbs, furthermore, permit 
either the Place or the Instrument to become the direct object 
(where thert is an Agent to serve as subjeci), allowing para-
phrases as 
Ci) I hit the roof with the stick 
(ii) I hit the stick on the roof 
It should be noticed that when the Instrument noun phrase is 
made the direct object, the Place preposition shows up, and that 
when the Place noun phrase is made the direct object, the Instru-
ment preposition shows up. This is because the rule for forming 
direct objects, like the rule for forming subjects, ha5 the 
effect of deletin€ the preposition that would otherwise be 
associated with the cate~ory Agent, Place, Instrument, etc. 




'." • -·: •y 
(24) I f:i!pped1- him on the leg 
{__~truck,._) 
{broke ·J . 
I ~ bent his leg 
Lshattered: 
(26) *I him on the legr::;:e J 
(_e hat tered 
Ir the sentencee paired by (23) and (24} are correctly inter-
preted as paraphrases of each other, and if that meano that 
they are identical in ~heir deep structure, it followe that 9ur 
investiga~ion into the classes of verbs associated with HIT and 
BREAK requires an understanding of the precise ways in which 
English gr'!lmmar deals with body-part nouns. 11 
ll . ; 
One suggestion on the way in which body~part nouns are to be 
treated in a grammar is found in the section entitled "The 
grammar of inalienable poss~ssion11 in Fillmore (1968}. 
I suggested above that t;he categories Agent and Instrunienta..:). 
were to be used _somehow to guarantee that the noun phrases that 
filled these positions.in sentence$ would be animate and inanimate 
respectively. Perhaps a more satisfactory way of dealing with 
the aame tacts is t~ say that the categories Agent and lnstr.ument 
impose a particular interpretation on the nouns that occur "under" 
them. The sentences we rejected above were sentences in which 
interpretations i'mpoaed on a noun are contradicted by facts that 
we know about the objects identified by the noun itself. In 
sentences (8) and (11), for example, we are forced to interpret 
THE ROCK t:1gentively; but since a rock is not animate, and is 
therefore known to be incapable of initiating any action. we 
must either interpret the sen~ences as meaningleaa,. or as fairy-
tale sentences in which THE ROCK was personified (or perhap~ the 
word we need is "animated"). It must remain an open question 
just what the best treatment of the distinction between normal 
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and semantically anomolous sentences i~. but we can at least 
be clear ab6ut the facts. I 	 shall $Uggest below that my first 
12formulation is more adequate. 
12For a careful discussion of this difference (or rather, a 
similar difference) 1 see D. 'l'. ½,ngendoen (1968). 
Since we have assigned two different categories:to the 
noun phrases we originally labeled Xt we must now ask whether 
the nouns that occur in the X role with these two verbs must be 
different Cort alternatively, if nouns are to be interpreted in 
two different ways depending on whether they are ide1tified a.a 
Places or as Objects). i I 
i 
Consider, in this regard, sentences (2;?) and (28). 
{27) I broke the top of the table 
(28) 1 hit the top of the table 
ln {27), the noun 'l'OP must be referring to the top of a table as 
a more or less distinct object, while on (28),_it can refer 
either to that or to a portion of the surface area of the table, 
Thie distincticn can probably be made clearer with a differ-
ent kind of example. Suppose you didn't know what T\llARGE meant, 
and you were told two things about 5ome twarge; 
(29) John hit the left side 	of the twarge 
(30) John hit the top of the twargo 
You might imagine, on bearing (29} and (30, that a twarge was 
some kind of solid object, and certainly nothing in the two 
sentences would contradict that assumption. But suppose you 
i,ere then told two more things about this twarge: 
(31) John broke tho le ft side of the twarge 
(32) John b:·oke tho Lop of the twarge 
This time you wou::d be forced to interpret SIDE and TOP, not 
as words designating portions of the surface area of the twarge 1 
but as more-or-less separable parts of it. The ideas you could 
have about what a twarge loo~ad like would be much more con-
strained after you heard (31) and (32) ~han before. It is clear, 
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in other words, that the X nouns that can occur with HIT must 
be· partiy different (or differently interpretable) from those 
which occur with BREAK. 
The fact that in sentences (28) and (30) tht noun TOP may 
be understood as referring either to an object .2!: to a location 
suggests to me that one ot the roles of the symbols Agent« Place_, 
etc.tis in the selection of nouns, and that they are not 
restricted in their effect to the im32osition of an interpretliltion 
on nouns. To appear as an Object, a noun must identify some-
thing that can either be an object or a location. 13 
l}The distinction could be made more .forcefully if we ,vould 
find nouns which can occur ae Places but nev~r a$ Objects. 
The word LAP might possibly be such a noun, but I am not sure. 
At leaet I am surer about the unacceptab"ility of 1 BROKE HIS 
LAP than I am about that of I BIT HI.SLAP. 
The ways in which we can understand the nouns that occur .with 
HIT are almost entirely accounted £oz- by referring to the cate-
gory Place, but those connect~d with the change-of-state verbs 
appear to involve idioeyncrat.:ic;: properties of individual ve:rbs. 
In othel:' words, the kinds of objects that TWARGE might refer to 
are quite different for the var-ious verbs in (34) 1 but not 60 
for those in (33).
il ·t :}I s~a.pped th twargestruck e 
smote 
n~:::rJI the twarge.Uroke j 
Uere for the firat time our 
''le t observations become _lexically
• mus now consider what there is t -~---.........=.::o::.- s_peeifi_£. 
ing which it · 0 say about objects conQer~-
is appropriate to use the word BREAK. 
already that the object mu.st be in .We have seen 
sorne sense "separable" or 
• 22 '"! 
discoritinuous wit~ other things, but that aspect of ita meaning 
is perhaps best associated with the cat~gqry Object .. 
A sentence like (:35) 
(35) I broke the dog 
i 
can be interpreted as referr:i;ng to something which happened to 
a :figurine in the shape of a dog1 or perhaps to a frozen dog, 
but 
I 
not to an ordinary dog. That is because BREAK requires of 
the entity named by i't13 Object nov.n that it be "rigid" in some 
of its dimensions. One can BREAK a dog's bonei but .1?-ot 1 ord_inarily, 
a dog. 
To show that we ar.e he:re dealing with a property of the word 
B~AK, rather than with chang:e_-ot-state verbs in general, we 111.a;y 
compare BREAK and BEND. An obj~ct tha.t can be BENT must be •trigidt1 
to the extent that it offers resistance Cone doesn't BEND a hand-
kerchief, normally). but it mu.et also be flexible. Then too, 
th$re are ~ore constraints on th~ permitted shapes of objects 
that can be BENT than for objects that can be BROKEN, but here 
14the beat l can do is expect the reader to know what I m~an. 
14Ifotice, too, that BEND differs f:rom FOLD in respect to both 
kinds of properties. resistence and shape. The resistance req-
uired when one is correctly using the word BEND is n9t required 
for FOLD, and there are further constr~:i,.nt.s still on the shape 
of objects tha~ ,'9.n be Ji'OLDED. One cannot, FOLD~ for instance, 
~ stt'ing. 
There are, then, these more or less epeeific_1 and at least 
intuitively graapable, properties of objects named by nouns 
capable of appearing non-anomal9usly with the verb BR)::AK. Qne 
could make these o:t>servations seem more formal, of course, by 
writing "rigidity" with an initial capital letter and postula-
ting it. as a semantic feature of certain nouns, but I believe 
it would be quite misleading to do so. It seems Vfpry unlikely 
to me that. anything is gained by tre.ating these p_articular 
"selectional. 11 properties of Bh.EA.K (and BEND,FOLDt etc.} in 
terms af semantic features that are assignable in any natural 
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wa:y to o·ther words. It h ra:th'er that the verb ;e~esu_pposel!l 
th.at the real ,,vorld objects named by tne nouns that occur with 
it have certain 1:nrsioal t1roperties. 
But we have still s~ip nothing about what BREAK means. By 
comparing BREAK w1:th BEND we can see tha't the former implies, 
while the latter does not, the a,ppeu"rarice of some discontinui~y 
in an external or internal s~rface of the object; but if there 
is more to say tha.n that, it is somethin~ that can be said as viell 
by dictionary m~kers as by inguiats. 
I am inclined to think that the systematic study of the 
semantic structure of these words ends pretty much with what we 
have ·already noted. To see criterial differences between BR,EAK, 
SMASH, SfiiATTER, to say noth attempt to discover what 
distinguish HIT, STRIKE, SL , SMITE, BUMP, etc., from eaeh 
otber, is to involve onesel in judgment~ that may vary widely 
from person to person and tat may individually have nothing to 
do ·with other facts about t e .English language. 
some of the 
syntactic and semantic prop our two words can be blamed 
on the fact that they are particular type; that is! 
many of the facts we have e countered are instances of general 
facts about whole classes o words or about uses and interpre-
tations of gran:uua'tical eate ries 'j:;he existence of which is deter.. 
minable1 independently of qu .s·tions of lexicography. 
Both of these verbs ca be used transitively 1 with subjects 
that are understood age~tiv ly as well ae •1th subjects that 
are understood :i.nstrumentally. But BREAK, unlike HIT 1 can also 
be used intra:n:sitively. BREilC is one of a class o:f verbs used 
to express a change of state irt some object, and as such it pro-
vides, in the form of its past participle, a stative adjective 
which is capable o.f describing the object in its Jatter state. 
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Our findings can be su 
Orie of the pro:pcfrties of HIT, ·namely the exis~ence of certain kinds 
of paraphrases when it.is used with body-part nouns, is a,ppa.rently 
s,ccounted for by referring to the ways iri which body-part nouns 
are used as indicators of placos tathe~ than as indicators of 
objects. And constraints on the apecific noun5 that can occur 
in construction with these verbs are partly determined by the 
categories Agent, Instrument, Place and Object. 
ill of these phenomena are either ascribable to larger 
grammatical facts or to whole classes of verbs. They fall under 
'lihat really amounts to our s:eneral knowledge of English, and are 
therefore to be treated only in the grammar. The only word-
specific information that related to the preeeding observa-
tions is (a) that given in formulas (19) and (21), the information 
that indieatee 1 for each of these verbs, the syntactic environ-
ments in which it is appropriate to use it, and {b) the informa-
tion that BREAK semantically expresses a change of state. 
Apart from the infor~ation about their general semantic 
character (as change-of-state verbs or not) and the needed indi-
cation of the environments into which they can be inserte~ the 
only really specific lexical information that we have encountered 
is (a) the special ways in which speakers of English accept the 
Object nouns that occur with BREAK and interpret themt and (b} 
the specific meanings of the two words. The word BREAK can only 
be appropriately used of 'an object that is "rigid11 in some of 
its dimensior,s, and it expresse~ the appearance of some discontin-
;1ity therein. (But why one can BREAK a thread 1 but not a cloth, 
is not easily covered by ~his statement.) The nouns that can 
occur with HIT apparently do not need to satisfy any require-
ments not associated with their categorization as Places, and 
what exactly is meant by H!T 1 in the sense of the kind of surface 
contact asserted by HIT in particular (as opposed to STRIKE, etc.), 
is extremely difficult to pin down. 
Certain aspects of the ffleanings of the two words simply 
have not been satisfactorily described, and I would not be sur-
prised to :find cwt that they cannot be. Although the ways in 
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whici'i words acquire meanings and change meanings, as well as 
the genen:11 ways in which numari beir.gs learn the meanings of 
words, will always be of professionaJ concei'n to linguists as 
linguistst it may well be that certain aspects of the meanings 
of many 6f the specific words i~ a language are every bit as 
well "explained" by a handful of examples and an anecdote as by 
a theory. 
Not every chan·ge-of-sta.te verb can pe used intransitively: 
consider SMASH and CUT in this respect. Not evet-y verb having 
syntactic properties of the kind represented by formula (19) 
· ie a change~of~stat~ verb: there is a large class of motion 
verbs syntactically like .BREAK, including MOVE, TURN, ROTATE, 
SPIN, etc. Not every verb that is semantically a change-of-
state verb and is syntactically transiti~e or intransitive jn a 
way analogous to that represented by formula (19) takes an 
Object: some take animate nouns, such as WAKE (UP). Some 
change-of-state verbs are understood as affecting a place on 
an object rather than an object as a whole. CUT and BITE, for 
example, are of this type, and show paraphrase relations of the 
type seen in (25) and (26) with body-part nouns. And some change-
ot-state verbs have associated adjectives that are not identical 
in form with their past pa,rticiples. AWAKE is the stative 
adjective for WAKE (UP),· and that must have something to do 
with the fact that nobody knows what the past participle of WAKE 
is! 
What these observations show is that many of the apparent 
regularities suggested by this study are slightly spurious, and 
what that means ia that the laxical description of some of the 
other verbs we have mentioned will be somewhat more detailed than 
that of BREAK or HIT. 
One of the conclusions that can be drawn from thia study  
is that the data we have examined fail to support the distinction  
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between synt11x Cas providing a "level" of representation) and 
semantics. Modifications that are being devised irt the tbeory 
of deep structure are tending more a~d more to p~oijide concepts 
of the kind th~t can be used quite directly for expri•sing 
semantic assertions about linguistic expressions. The designa-
tion of noun phrases as Agents, Placest etc. 1 tr.at have been 
used in my approach. h~s a role in semantic interpretation, and 
such properties of verbs as the change-of-state feature we have 
associated with BREAK are semantic in a more obvio•.1a wa.y. 
The assignment of such semantic features has, however, clear 
syntactic conseauences. Current developments within the theory 
of generative transformational grammar suggest that all purel~ 
syntactic concepts in grammar relate to the application of 
syntactic r~les, not to the underlying representation of sentences. 15 
15 r have in mind unpublished manuscripts by James D. Mccawley, 
John R. _Roas, George Lakoff and D. T. Langendoen. 
Certain other matters that have been considered proper to 
semantics but distinct from syntax include formalizations of the 
notion of semantic anomaly through semantic projection rules of 
the type proposed by Katz and Fodo~. 16 These authors distinguish 
1··
~Katz and Fodor (1963). 
betwe~n markers and distinguishers among the features that compose 
semantic 6haracterizations of lexical items. The distinguishers 
are tho~e featµre$ of the semantic description of a word whi~h 
are idiosync~atic to that word. The markers are those features 
which enter into se~antic generalizations, features in Lerms 
of which various semantic judgments on sentences--including judg-
ments on semant~c anomaly--can be formalized and made explicit. 
Since a part of the description of certain words is a state-
ment of their selectional restrictions--that is, a statement of 
the •condi Lions that de terr.-,ine their meaningful use--i t should be 
the case that all semantic anomalies should be describable by a 
single device. Our consideration of the conditions of appropriateness 
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for the use of tvords iike BREAK, BEND and FOLD, h,owever t suggest 
that selectional info:rrnaUon can be as id:i,osyncratic as the 
kinds 'of properties that have been referred ~o as semantic 
distinguishers. The treatment of the selectional propertiea'of 
verbs cannot be carried out in a non-ad-hoc way, it seems to ~e. 
by seeking features on nouns which do or do not violate restric-
tions asso~iated witt pa~ticular ~hange-of-state verbs. In 
fact, it looks very much as if for a considerable portion of 
the vocabulary of a J,anguage, the conditions determining the 
appropriate use of a ward involve statement~ about properties of 
real world objects rather than statements about the semantic 
features of words,· 
Some facts about language that have been hitherto tr.eate.d 
in terms of a semantic interpretive component viewed as distin~t 
fro• the syntactic tomponent have ~een ab~orbed into the latter--
that is, they have been shown to be explainable wittin a combined 
syntactic-semantic component. Other facts that have been treated 
by some aa belonging to semantic theory proper are believed 
to be more correctly assigned to the study of the speakers' 
practical knowledge of their language, It seems to me that the 
explanatory scope of semantics,as such, to the extent that 
semantic knowledge can be separated from knowledge of syntax 
(or syntax-semantics) and knowledge of the world, should be 
limited to a clarification of the conceptual interrelatedness 
of lexical items and the semantic judgments on sentences that 
can be directly accounted for in terms of this interrelatedness. 
- 28 -
Bibliography 
Noam 	 Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.'l'. Press, 
1965. 
Noam 	 Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, Harper and Row, 1966. 
Charles J. Fillmore, 11The case for case, 11 in Universals in 
Linguistic Theory, Bach and Harms, editors, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1968. 
Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor, "The structure of a 
semantic theory, 11 Language 39.170-210, 1963. 
Barbara M. Hall, Subject and Object, M.I.T. Dissertation, 1965. 
George Lakoff, "Instrumental adverbs and the concept of deep 
semantic content, 11 unpublished manuscript, 1967. 
D. 	 Terence Langendoen, 11 0n selection, projection, meaning, and 
.semantic content," ir. this report, 1968. 
- 29 -
